Natalie Rozet | March 22, 2015
Combating corruption is an essential step for establishing adequate human security. Bribery, institutional incompetency, and lack of governmental transparency stunt the growth of developing countries and fuel unrest. However, the extent to which corruption affects the outbreak of violence or conflict is debated. Some scholars argue that corruption in government has a direct effect on a country’s stability. Sarah Chayes, for example, argues that, “Corrupt governance doesn’t just aid terrorist organizations by driving indignant citizens into their arms; it provides haven and logistical support for those very same groups, as officials avert their eyes in exchange for a bribe.”[1] Furthermore, the U.S. Institute for Peace has argued that “countries which are perceived to have the highest levels of public-sector corruption are also those plagued by long-standing conflict,” emphasizing the correlation between lack of security and corrupted governance.[2] Philippe Le Billon, on the other hand, explains that some forms of corruption may facilitate “the creation of a political order in which rulers can coopt opposition groups, thereby providing a measure of political stability and avoiding conflict.”[3] This study tests the effect that corruption in government has on violence and conflict.
In 2003, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 58/4 – the UN Convention
against Corruption – citing that, “Corruption is an insidious plague that…leads
to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and
allows organized crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to
flourish.”[4]
The international community has become increasingly vigilant towards corruption
and certain countries, such as Mexico, have taken significant steps towards combating the problem.[5] It
is important to understand the effect of corruption on violence in order to
assess the merit of such policies and the allocation of resources toward
anti-corruption measures.
Research
Design
Table
1. Summary Statistics[6]
Variable
|
Mean
|
Std. Dev.
|
Min.
|
Max.
|
Description
|
||||
Conflict
|
2.1
|
0.4
|
0
|
5
|
0 = Perfect Peace
|
||||
Corruption
|
38.0
|
12.8
|
0
|
100
|
100 = No Corruption
|
||||
GDP per capita
(ln)
|
8.81
|
1.0
|
0
|
100
|
GDP per
capita, PPP Constant Int’l USD
|
||||
Inequality
|
40.0
|
9.0
|
0
|
100
|
0 = Perfect Equality
|
||||
Institutional
Strength[7]
|
5.6
|
2
|
0
|
10
|
0 = No Strength, Weak State
|
||||
Observations
|
79
|
||||||||
____________________________________________________________________________________
The dependent
variable in the study, which measures the level of violence and conflict in
each country, is a compound variable consisting of every state’s scores in the
following categories: homicide rates, violent demonstrations, terrorism, deaths
from conflict, and total scores on internal (civil) and external (war) conflicts.
The variable ranges from 0 to 5; higher scores are representative of greater levels
of violence and conflict (see Figure 1 for peace index rankings of selected countries
in the dataset). The independent variable, corruption, is measured by a
country’s Corruption Perception Index score.[8] Corruption
ranges from 0 to 100 with lower scores indicating higher corruption perception.
The study controls for countries' economic development and inequality among
the population, measured by GDP per capita[9]
and the Gini coefficient, respectively (see Table 1).[10] Higher
GDP per capita scores indicate greater economic development. Lower Gini scores
indicate more economic equality among the population.
Findings
According to the bivariate regression model, corruption has a statistically significant effect on a country’s levels of violence and conflict. On average, as corruption improves by 1 point, a country’s level of conflict will decrease by approximately 0.018 points. Figure 2 illustrates the bivariate relationship of corruption on conflict.[11]
Table
2. Determinants of Peace & Conflict
DV: Conflict
|
(1)
|
(2)
|
Corruption
|
-0.018***
|
-0.016***
|
(-6.71)
|
(-3.86)
|
|
GDP per capita (ln)
|
0.034
|
|
(0.82)
|
||
Inequality
|
0.003
|
|
(0.82)
|
||
Institutional Strength
|
-0.035
|
|
(-1.37)
|
||
Constant
|
2.794***
|
2.472***
|
(25.64)
|
(6.70)
|
|
Adj. R-Squared
|
0.36
|
0.36
|
Observations
|
79
|
79
|
Note: OLS
estimates with t-stats in parentheses. * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
_______________________________________________________________________________________
When controlling
for a country’s economic development, inequality, and institutional strength,
the effect of corruption on conflict is only slightly reduced. In the multivariate
model, on average, an improvement of corruption by 1 point reduces the conflict
score of a country by 0.016 points. The model also estimates that, on average,
a 1% increase in a country’s GDP per capita is associated with a 0.034 point
increase in the level of violence. Although counterintuitive, the relationship
between GDP per capita and levels of conflict may be due to the fact that
richer countries engage in more robust levels of conflict, such as war. The
model also estimates that an average increase of inequality by 1 point
increases the average likelihood of conflict. Perhaps unsurprisingly, an
increase in institutional strength of a state is associated with a decline in
violence and conflict. Although all the control variables demonstrate some
effect on a state’s level of conflict, all four lacked statistical
significance.
Based on these
findings, anti-corruption policies are useful for increasing
and maintaining peace. Even when controlling for a nation’s wealth, economic inequality
among the population, and institutional strength, corruption has the only
significant effect on levels of violence and conflict. The data suggest that
policies which solely target institutional or economic reform may be inadequate
for the suppression of conflict if they are not paired with anti-corruption
measures.
The findings of this study are
susceptible to challenges based reverse causality; the study does not
adequately establish time order. It may be that corruption in government is a
product of civil unrest and conflict, since the framework for government
oversight is usually lacking in extreme conflict areas. Additionally, economic
development of a country may be stunted by unrest, thus reversing the causation
of the model. However, empirical evidence, such as the growth of Cartels in Mexico[12]
and the Taliban in Afghanistan[13]
has demonstrated that certain forms of violence are heavily dependent on the
ability to buy off officials or rally support among the local population in the
absence of competent governance. The conclusion in this study justifies
anti-corruption measures as a method of suppressing conflict; however, further
research may be required to determine the relationship between a country’s
wealth and its levels of conflict.
[1] Chayes, Sarah. “Thieves of
State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security,” WW Norton & Company, New York, 2015.
[2] “Governance, Corruption, and
Conflict,” United States Institute of
Peace, Washington, D.C. 2010.
[3] Philippe Le Billon, “Buying Peace
or Fueling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts,” Journal of International Development,
Vol: 15, Issue: 4. 17 Apr. 2003. A: 12 Mar. 2015. (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jid.993/pdf)
[4] “58/4. United Nations Convention
against Corruption,” United Nations General Assembly, New York, Oct. 31, 2003.
(http://www.un-documents.net/a58r4.htm)
[5] Bravo, Tomas. “Mexico Fires
Thousands of Police to Combat Corruption,” Reuters,
Aug. 30, 2010. (http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/30/us-mexico-drugs-police-idUSTRE67T52D20100830)
[6] Data sources: I) Conflict: Global Peace Index, Institute for Economics and
Peace. II)
Corruption: Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International. III)
Economy: GDP per capita, WB. IV) Inequality: Gini Coefficient, WB. V) Institutional Strength: Rule of Law, Quality
of Governance.
[7] Institutional strength measures separation of powers, independence of the
judiciary, extent of
penalties for abuse of power, and the protection of civil liberties. (Quality
of Governance Dataset: http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.)
[8] It is important to note that the
perception of corruption is
subjective and, in many cases, country-specific. Consider the deferring legal
framework across countries in regards to private sector funding of public/political
affairs. In the U.S., for example, it is legal for private firms to lobby the government.
Alternatively, lobbying in India is illegal. In Israel, a former mayor was
sentenced to six years in prison for accepting a ‘bribe’ from a private
company. Consequently, the perception
of corruption by the respective constituents of these countries is heavily dependent
on the legal framework in which their governments operate. What may be
unequivocally considered as corruption in one country does not make it
universally recognized as such.
[10] Originally, the study also
controlled for regime type, however, this variable was highly correlated with
the main independent variable (corruption). Subsequently, the results were bias
due to multicollinearity and the third control variable was omitted.
[11] The lowess line demonstrates
local averages of conflict levels for each score on corruption and the fitted
values show the averages across the entire dataset.
[12] Ioan Grillo, “The Apparent
Massacre of Dozens of Students Exposes the Corruption at the Heart of Mexico,” Time Magazine, 10 Oct. 2014. (http://time.com/3490853/mexico-massacre-students-police-cartel-corruption/)
[13] Bilal Sarway, “Why Taliban are
so Strong in Afghanistan,” BBC, 2
Feb. 2012. (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16851949)
Works
Cited
“58/4.
United Nations Convention against Corruption,” United Nations General Assembly,
New York, Oct. 31, 2003. http://www.un-documents.net/a58r4.htm
Bravo,
Tomas. “Mexico Fires Thousands of Police to Combat Corruption,” Reuters, Aug. 30, 2010. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/30/us-mexico-drugs-police-idUSTRE67T52D20100830.
Chayes,
Sarah. “Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security,” WW Norton & Company, New York, 2015.
Corruption
Perception Index, Transparency International, 2014. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014.
GDP
per Capita PP, World Bank, 2010-2014. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.
Gini
Coefficient, World Bank, 2009-2014. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI.
Global
Peace Index, Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014. http://economicsandpeace.org/research/iep-indices-data/global-peace-index
“Governance,
Corruption, and Conflict,” United States
Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. 2010. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/ETC-D/NPEC/480021.PDF
Grillo,
Ioan. “The Apparent Massacre of Dozens of Students Exposes the Corruption at
the Heart of Mexico,” Time Magazine,
10 Oct. 2014. http://time.com/3490853/mexico-massacre-students-police-cartel-corruption/
Le
Billon, Philippe. “Buying Peace or Fueling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed
Conflicts,” Journal of International
Development, Vol: 15, Issue: 4. 17 Apr. 2003. A: 12 Mar. 2015. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jid.993/pdf
Rule
of Law, Quality of Governance Dataset, 2009-2012. http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.
Sarway,
Bilal. “Why Taliban are so Strong in Afghanistan,” BBC, 2 Feb. 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16851949
